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THE HINDUTVA JUDGMENTS: A COMMENT
Arvind Narain *
Mathew John*

In 1995-96 the Supreme Court delivered a set of seven decisions along with
one clarifying judgment which are popularly referred to as the Hindutva cases.l All
these cases were decided under the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951, and though
two of these cases resulted in the invalidation of elections on grounds of violation
of the act, what is clearly borne out through these judgments is the legitimacy given
by the Supreme Court to the politics of the Hindu right. This paper attempts to point
out that the failings of the Court while attempting definitions of Hindutva and
Hinduism; terms that can no longer be located in the simplistic definitional processes
employed by Supreme Court.
In what are clearly the two core judgments - R Y Prabhoo v. P K Kunte2 and
Manohar Joshi v. Nitin Bhaurao Patil3 the court laid down the basic principles on
which all further actions of the Hindu right are to be predicated. In Prabhoo's case
the court dealt with the meaning of the terms Hinduism and Hindutva and defined
it by referring to a previous decision of the court in C.W. T., Madras v. Sreedharan4
which noted that "It is a matter of common knowledge that Hinduism embraces
within itself so many diverse forms of beliefs, faiths, practices and worship that it
is difficult to define the term Hindu with precision". The court also referred to
another case5 which quoted from Dr Radhakrishnan "Unlike other religions in the
world, the Hindu religion does not claim anyone prophet; it does not worship any
one god; it does not subscribe to anyone dogma; it does not believe in anyone
philosophic concept; it does not follow anyone set of religious rites or performances
in fact it does not appear to satisfy the narrow traditional features of any
religion or creed. It may be described as a way of life and nothing more". From these
two decisions the court concluded "that no precise meaning can be ascribed to the
term Hindu, Hindutva and Hinduism and no meaning in the abstract can confine to
the narrow realm of religion alone, excluding the content of Indian culture and
*

2

IV Year B.A., LL.B. (Hons.), National Law School of India University.
Manohar Joshi v. N.B. Patil, (1995) 7 SCALE 30; Y. Prabhoo v. P.K. Kunte, (1995) 7 SCALE 1;
R.G. Kapse v. H.R. Singh, (1995) 7 SCALE 60; Sadhvi Rithambara v. H.R. Singh, (1995) SCALE
60; R. Mayekar v. Ce/ine D'Silva, (1995) SCALE 72; M. Save v. D.Y. Pathrikar, (1995) 7 SCALE
85; Goyal v. S.S.K. Singh, (1995) SCALE 88; S.V. Madhik v. S.S. Naik, (1995) 7 SCALE 92; For
a detailed review of these judgments See B. Cossman & Ratna Kapoor, Secularism: Benchmarked
by the Hindu Right, EPW September 21, 1996.
(1995) 7 SCALE 1.

3

(1995) 7 SCALE 30.

4

(1976) Suppl SCR, 478.

5

Sastri Yagnapurushdasji v. Muldas Bhudardas, 1996 (3) SCR 342.
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heritage. It is also indicated that the term Hindutva is related more to the way of life
of the people in the subcontinent. It is difficult to appreciate how in the face of these
decisions the term Hindutva or Hinduism per se in the abstract can be assumed to
mean and be equated with narrow fundamentalist Hindu bigotry". Thus the court
arrived at a definition of Hindutva by referring to a set of abstract formulations
regarding Hinduism in previous decisions totally disregarding the contextualities in
which these terms operate.6
In Chandrakanta Goyal v. S.J. Kholi,1 probably the most progressive of the
Hindutva judgments, the court refined the concept of Hindutva and noted that the
use of the word Hindutva in a speech has to be understood in the context and
according to the manner in which it was meant to be understood by the audience,
irrespective of the meaning Hindutva in the abstract. This understanding of Hindutva
was used to decide that an appeal to vote on the basis of religion in a temple
amounted to a corrupt practice under s. 123(3) of the Representation of People's Act,
1951. While the court recognised that speech has to understood in context it failed
to recognise that Hindutva represents a distinct ideological formation with the
backing and ·support of an elaborate organisational apparatus.s It is important to
realise that all speech is embedded in a set of material and ideological conditions
and in this case it is difficult to envisage an allusion to Hindutva outside of the
ideology of the RSS and its affiliates.9
We believe that the failure of the court to locate the politics of Hindutva within
the ideological structures of the Sangh Parivar as also the formulation of an abstract
definition of Hindutva devoid of any relationality to material conditions of reality

6

TraditionaJly Hinduism has been viewed as space of competing pluralities, but with the Court
equating Hinduism with the monolithic Hindutva ideology of the RSS and its affiliates the
possibilities of resistance from within the boundaries of Hinduism might have been reduced
considerably. However we believe that in contemporary settings it is very difficult to differentiate
between these two terms as they operate from the same space (i.e. the platform of the Hindu right)
and will therefore use these terms interchangeably.

7

(1995) 7 SCALE 92.

8

This was recognised to some extent by the Bombay High Court in R. Mayekar v. Celine D'Silva
(1995) SCALE 72 where Variyava J. opined that "in my view where the plank has been declared
by the leader of the party and the leader of the party has complete control of the affairs ofthe party,
once it is proved and held that the plank declared by the leaders amounts to a corrupt practice, every
candidate of that party will be bound by that plank. As it is set out therefore that the plank of
Hindutva as declared by the leaders amounts to corrupt practice of appealing for votes on the basis
of religion and also amounts to a corrupt practice of attempting to create enmity and hatred between
Hindus and Muslims."

9

For purposes of convenience the RSS and its various front organisations like the VHP, BJP etc will
be referred to as the Sangh Parivar. It is beyond the scope of this paper to establish the linkages
that exist between the RSS and its various frontal organisations however it must be mentioned that
the RSS plays a vital role in the shaping of a exc\usivist Hindutva ideology based on religious
intolerance and aimed at the establishing of a Hindu Rashtra. For a detailed study on the Hindutva
ideology and the role of the Sangh Parivar in shaping this ideology; see Tapan Basu et al. Klwki

Shorts Saffron Flags (1993).
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is the legitimising of the hate politics of the Sangh Parivar which has scant respect
for constitutional and democratic values. I 0 Therefore what is called for is a paradigm
shift in defining concepts such that concepts are not defined philosophically but
historicallyll and contextually. Thus the important questions that have to be asked
while attempting a definition of Hindutva will be - Do people see it as a plural way
of life? Does a particular community get militantly mobilised under the banner of
Hindutva? Does Hindutva instil a fear psychosis among minority groupings? -...
Constructing a definition of Hindutva on the basis of these questions one finds that
Hindutva represents a exclusivist, violent, and unsecular grouping.12 This understanding of Hindutva was recognised by the Bombay High Court in Ramakant Meyer
v. Celine D'Silval3 where the court looked at the appeal to Hindutva as a corrupt
practice attempting to create hatred between Hindus and Muslims. Unfortunately
however the Supreme Court failed to recognise the complexities of the Hindutva
movement while defining it. Thus the point being made is that Hindutva has to be
understood in terms of what the leaders say, how the people understand what is being
said and finally what are the consequences of what is being said. Only if we
understand these elements of the definitional process can we escape the mystical
meanderings which obfuscate the real issues and ensure that the operation of law is
not paralysed.
We would like to note a seemingly peripheral but important point that is often
glossed over when one refers to Hindutva. We see Hindutva as a Bhraminical
ideology seeking to create a pan Hindu/Indian identity which is inherently
marginalising and aimed at stabilizing a Bhraminical hegemony. Legitimising
Hindutva as the Indian way or' life would therefore be emphasizing historically
relevant questions as also a history of resistance to the dominant Bhraminical

10 Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to make a detailed study of the unconstitutional,
undemocratic and clearly unsecular politics of the Hindu right however it might be apposite to note
the position of this formation on various issues - Gowalkar an ideologue of the Sangh Parivar
fashions his cultural nationalism along the lines of Nazi Germany ••... Germany has shown how
well-nigh impossible it is for races and cultures, having differences going to ,the root, to be
assimilated into one united whole, a good lesson for us in Hindustan to learn and profit by". See
M.S. Gowalkar, We Our Nationhood Defined 27 (1938); See Election Manifesto, 1990 of the BJP
(this document clearly spells out the resolve of the party to build the temple at the disputed site;
shortly afterwards the Mosque was demolished); L.K. Advani is reported to have announced to the
kar sevaks at the date of the demolition of the Mosque "We don't need bulldozers. If we all take
a theta each, the Masjid can't survive and the 11Ullbacannot be traced." Citizens Tribunal on
Ayodhya (1994). "Let all Muslims accept Ram as their hero and all communal problems will be
over" Organizer, 20th June, 197 \. Though these positions are randomly chosen they all reflect the
basic premise regarding the fundamentally unsecular politics of the Sangh Parivar.
II

Reference to 'historical' is antithetical to the historicity built up through case law as in Prabhoo's
case, supra n. I which defined Hindutva in abstract terms as "a way of life": Even at the risk of
repetition we wish to emphasise that Hindutva is not an abstract philosophical concept but a
historical concept embedded in the ideology of the Hindu right.

12 "Depositions

at the citizens tribunal clearly indicate that the forces of Hindutva do actually instill

a fear psychosis
13 Supra n. 8.

among Muslims"

Citizen Tribunal on Ayodhya

(1994).
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ideology. One only has ~o look at various articulations to see this critique of
Hindutva. As Kanchah Ilaiah puts in what will no doubt come as a rude shock to
all the complacent Bhramins secure in their knowledge of a secular Hinduism
"Hinduism has never been a humane philosophy. It is the most brutal religious
school that the history of religion has witnessed. The Dalit Bahujan castes of India
are living evidence of this brutality."14Thus the call to thejudiciary is not legitimise
Bhraminical or caste oppression, through concepts like Hindutva but to take a
progressive approach as regards the complex issues that it is asked to adjudicate.
In conclusion we submit that firstly Hindutva is a historical and not a
philosophic concept and secondly Hindutva cannot be defined without taking into
account the agency role of Hindutva in promoting conflict and the essentially
Bhraminical nature of the entire concept.

13 K. llaih, Why I am not a Hindu, 113 (1996).

